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 While rebel groups are obligated to comply with international humanitarian law 
(IHL) only indirectly, many rebel groups express intent to comply with IHL.  Previous 
research has examined the conditions that make compliance likely.  While these studies 
emphasize legitimacy-seeking, little research considers whether there are tangible 
benefits for rebel groups that comply with IHL.  Studying whether rebel groups that 
comply with IHL are more likely to receive either military or diplomatic support from a 
foreign state provides an opportunity to bridge the literature on rebel group compliance 
with the literature on foreign state sponsorship of rebel groups.  This study considers 
rebel group compliance with IHL alongside more extensively studied determinants of 
rebel group sponsorship, such as regime type and relative military capabilities, in order to 
assess whether rebel groups that comply with IHL are more likely to receive support from 
a foreign state.  The results of the Firth logit regressions performed in this analysis 
indicate that democratic sponsors are less likely to sponsor rebel groups that use child 
soldiers, but that when democratic and autocratic sponsors are considered jointly, rebel 
group compliance with IHL does not appear to influence sponsorship decisions. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 On February 23, 1998, the United States’ special envoy to the Balkans, Robert 
Gelbard, categorized the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as a terrorist group while 
speaking in Belgrade.  Among other crimes, the KLA drew condemnation from the U.S. 
for killing and abducting civilians, specifically ethnic Serbs, both during and after its 
fight for an independent Kosovo (Human Rights Watch, 2001).  Despite Gelbard’s 
censure, Richard Holbrooke, acting as a private citizen at President Clinton’s behest, met 
with KLA leadership in the summer of 1998.  Perhaps even more puzzling, NATO 
provided air support to bolster the KLA’s position against Serbian forces during 
Operation Allied Force from March to June 1999.  How, then, did the KLA go from 
being a labeled a terrorist organization to receiving both diplomatic and military support 
from the U.S. and its NATO allies?  
 A myriad of potential explanations exist, such as NATO’s history in the region 
and the higher rate of atrocity committed by Milosevic’s Serbian forces.  However, I 
argue that an overlooked factor is the KLA’s publication of a document in November 
1998 instructing KLA fighters to exercise restraint when engaged militarily.  For 
example, order No. 3 in this document asserts, “Improper behavior with respect to the 
civilian population is to be prevented in all KLA units.” (KLA, 1998).  This order was 
given in response to pressure from the U.S. and served to characterize the KLA as the 
“good” actor in the conflict.  It would have been untenable for NATO to carry out a 
humanitarian intervention by allying itself with an actor know to be in violation 
international humanitarian law (IHL). 
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 The KLA’s issuance of this order is an instance of the broader phenomenon of 
rebel groups expressing intent to comply with IHL, an act that is surprising since rebel 
groups do not have legal standing to formally ratify the Geneva Conventions.  Since there 
is neither a direct nor an enforceable obligation for non-state actors like rebel groups to 
comply with IHL and since compliance should at least in theory produce better 
humanitarian outcomes, it is important to study which factors may encourage rebel group 
compliance.  Specifically, this analysis focuses on foreign state sponsorship to ask: how 
does rebel group compliance with IHL influence the likelihood of a rebel group receiving 
support from a foreign state? 
 An analysis of Cunningham et al.’s (2013) Non-State Actor data and Jo’s (2015) 
data indicates that from 1989-2009, during the time period in which approximately 20 
percent of rebel groups committed themselves to comply with some aspect of IHL, only 
11 percent of rebel groups received support from democratic states while 48 percent of 
rebel groups received foreign state support.  This indicates that not only democratic 
governments are providing military or diplomatic support to rebel groups that declare 
themselves in compliance with IHL.  Since both democratic and non-democratic states 
alike provide support to rebel groups that comply with IHL, it is appropriate to ask how 
rebel group compliance with IHL influences foreign state decisions to provide military or 
diplomatic support to a rebel group.  This question is important for foreign policy, as it is 
possible that both democratic and non-democratic states are reluctant to support rebel 
groups that commit atrocities.  Understanding the mechanisms that underlie this dynamic 
can help policymakers learn how to incentivize more rebel groups to comply with IHL, 
without the applicability being limited to democratic governments.   
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 I argue that foreign states are more likely to provide support to rebel groups that 
comply with IHL regardless of whether the foreign states providing support are 
democracies.  Furthermore, I expect that rebel group compliance with IHL is a significant 
enough factor in sponsorship decisions to maintain relevance alongside other strategic 
considerations such as regime type, proximity, and relative power.  By bringing together 
the broader literature regarding foreign state support for rebel groups in civil war and 
rebel group compliance with IHL, I am able to robustly test the relationship between 
compliance and support.   
 
III. Literature Review 
 I draw on and integrate two broad bodies of literature in this analysis: First, the 
literature regarding foreign state support for rebel groups and second, the literature 
regarding rebel group compliance with IHL.  The literature on foreign state support for 
rebel groups considers more traditional determinants of foreign state sponsorship, such as 
geopolitical incentives.  Next, I discuss the applicability of IHL to rebel groups before 
considering the nexus of rebel group compliance and foreign state support.  The 
combination of these two literatures is the foundation of this analysis.  Jo (2015) assumes 
that “support and recognition are not forthcoming without the sense of approval or 
expectation about the viability of authority of a rebel group” (p. 27).  This analysis 
bridges the gap between the rebel group compliance literature and the foreign state 
support literature by including compliance in models of support.  Focusing on support 
circumvents the intangible concept of legitimacy, enabling the rigorous empirical 
analysis of a specific outcome of compliance.  By integrating these two literatures, it is 
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possible to study whether foreign state sponsors are more likely to provide military or 
diplomatic support when rebel groups are compliant with IHL.  Finally, I conclude the 
literature review by considering counter-points to the notion potential sponsors are 
influenced by rebel group compliance with IHL.  Throughout this analysis, I adopt Jo’s 
(2015) definition of rebel groups as “military organizations that fight against a central 
government” (p. 36), with a focus on those groups that “engage in direct hostilities and 
launch military attacks on governments.” (p. 38).   
 
Foreign State Support for Rebel Groups in Civil War Literature 
 Common approaches to studying foreign state support for rebel groups are to 
conceptualize rebel groups as extensions of alliances, to characterize support as a means 
to harass rival states, to emphasize the role of neighboring states in providing rebel group 
support, or to consider how outside involvement impacts the likelihood of civil war (on 
alliances: Saideman, 20021; San-Akca, 2009; San-Akca, 2016; on rivalry: Salehyan, 
2008; Salehyan et al. 2011; Maoz & San-Akca, 2012; San-Akca, 2016; on neighboring 
states: Byman et al., 2001; Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005; on the likelihood of civil war: 
Gleditsch, 20072; Salehyan, 2007).  With the exception of Salehyan et al. (2014), who 
consider the number of human rights organizations (HROs) in foreign state sponsors of 
rebel groups, this literature largely neglects to consider whether rebel group compliance 
with IHL increases the likelihood of receiving military or diplomatic support.  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Saideman’s (2002) findings are inconclusive regarding whether relative power of the 
host state influences external support (including from non-state actors) for groups in 
ethnic conflict. 
2 Gleditsch (2007) studies how a number of transnational linkages affect the risk of 
violent civil conflict, including conflict in neighboring states. 
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addition, prior to the work by Salehyan et al. (2011) little of this literature considers 
characteristics of rebel groups that influence the likelihood of receiving support.  Instead, 
the majority of the literature studies characteristics within foreign state-host state dyads. 
 One of the most studied state characteristics in considering support for rebel 
groups is regime type of both the foreign state (sponsoring state) and the host state (state 
that the rebel group is fighting).  This literature began with interstate war and the findings 
have since been adapted to the civil war literature.  Chan (1984) finds that in dyads 
democracies are less willing to go to war with each other, although they are no less likely 
to fight non-democracies.  Bremer (1992) extends this finding using Chan’s (1984) data 
by suggesting that at least one democracy in a dyad decreases the chance of interstate 
war.  An independent effect of political system type on the likelihood of militarized 
interstate disputes was detected when Maoz & Russett (1992) controlled for distance, 
wealth, economic growth, alliances, and political stability.  During the Cold War, 
Forsythe (1992) notes that this relationship didn’t fully extend to intrastate conflict 
because the U.S. was willing to covertly sponsor action against other industrialized 
democracies as concern with containment took precedence over the principal of non-
intervention.  However, in general the literature that considers support for rebel groups as 
a means to undermine a rival state applies the regime type findings of the interstate 
conflict literature to internal conflict (Salehyan, 2008; Salehyan et al. 2011; Maoz & San-
Akca, 2012; San-Akca, 2016).   
 More recently, a small body of literature has started to incorporate rebel group 
characteristics such as the group’s strength, transnational constituencies, and the number 
of civilians killed by a group (Salehyan et al., 2011; 2014).  Through the application of a 
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principal-agent framework, Salehyan et al. (2011) find that a rebel group’s strength and 
the presence of transnational constituencies with links to the group influence the 
likelihood of foreign state support for the group.  A later study suggests that states that 
value IHL may either refuse to sponsor groups that commit violations or that these states 
may pressure groups to comply with IHL after sponsorship (Salehyan et al., 2014).  The 
finding that rebel group characteristics are relevant to sponsorship decisions helps 
motivate my argument that foreign states are more likely to sponsor compliant rebel 
groups.  I diverge from Salehyan et al. (2014) by arguing that both democratic and non-
democratic states are more likely to support groups that comply rather than focusing on 
democracies. 
 
Rebel Group Compliance with International Humanitarian Law 
 On July 12, 1978, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions entered into 
force.  An extension of Common Article 3, this Protocol extends much of the 
humanitarian law governing international wars to internal armed conflicts (ICRC, n.d.).   
When the Protocol was adopted in 1977, eighty percent of armed conflicts since 1945 had 
been internal rather than international (ICRC, n.d.).  In response to this new reality, a 
central goal of Additional Protocol II was, and remains, to increase protection for 
civilians in the midst of internal armed conflict.   
 However, only state actors can ratify and thus formally agree to be bound by 
international law; traditionally, non-state actors are merely indirectly bound by the state 
in which they operate (Forsythe, 1978).  Although rebel groups can’t formally ratify the 
Geneva Conventions, the consensus in the international legal community is that 
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international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to all parties in internal armed conflicts, 
including rebel groups, specifically through Additional Protocol II3 (Cassese, 1981; 
Meron, 1995; Sivakumaran, 2006; Sassóli, 2010; Kamatali, 2013).  In summary, rebel 
groups are expected to comply with IHL, and, despite the lack of an enforcement 
mechanism, rebel groups have frequently signaled their intent to comply.  They are able 
to do so through mechanisms such as unilateral declarations and “bilateral agreements 
with governments, international organizations, and NGOS.” (Jo, 2015, p. 87).  For 
example, about 20 percent of the 250 rebel groups involved in civil wars from 1990-2010 
expressed intent to comply with some aspect of international law (Jo, 2015, p. 87).  
 States may choose to support rebel groups that are compliant with IHL for a 
variety of reasons.  First, a sponsoring state’s value for IHL may inform decisions to 
support compliant rebel groups (Salehyan et al., 2014; Jo, 2015; Stanton, 2016).  
Alternatively, a fear of public backlash for supporting non-compliant rebel groups could 
drive states to consider compliance when making sponsorship decisions (Aldrich et al., 
1989; Murdie & Davis, 2012; Wallace, 2013; Kreps and Wallace, 2016; Wallace, 2019).  
Third, states that do not place a high value on IHL and that have more limited domestic 
audiences may still be sensitive to potential consequences from the international 
community or domestic political elites for supporting non-compliant groups (Weeks, 
2008; 2012; Hafner-Burton, 2009; Tomz, 2012).  For example, these consequences could 
range from loss of reputation to public condemnation to sanctions.  These consequences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 There is, however, disagreement over the legal justification of the application of IHL in 
internal armed conflicts.  See Cassese (1981), Sivakumaran (2006), Sassóli (2010), and 
Kamatali (2013). 
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are not mutually exclusive; public condemnation can harm a state’s reputation, which in 
turn can produce backlash from domestic elites.  
 Scholars that ask why rebel groups comply with IHL largely argue that compliant 
rebel groups are more likely to be perceived as legitimate, both by domestic audiences 
and by the international community (Ewumbe-Monono, 2006; Sivakumaran, 2006; 
Ryngaert, 2008; Higgins, 2009; Bellamy, 2012; Jo, 2015; Stanton, 2016).  Legitimacy is 
derived from a rebel group’s goals, the means by which it achieves those goals, as well as 
characteristics of the group itself.  Compliance with IHL can legitimize a rebel group’s 
means, but this does not mean that rebel groups that comply are inherently legitimate, as 
their goals or characteristics may still not be.  However, it is possible for legitimate 
means to influence perceptions of a rebel group’s goals.  Compliance is a necessary, but 
not sufficient condition for legitimacy.  Both domestically and internationally, legitimacy 
plays a role in signifying the “right” of the rebel group to fight against the government.   
 However, this analysis takes a step beyond legitimacy, which is intangible.  
Instead, I argue that rebel groups that comply with IHL are more likely to receive 
international support.  If we accept the argument that compliance with IHL serves to 
validate a rebel group’s goals, then foreign states should be more likely to provide 
material support to those rebel groups that comply with IHL.  This analysis sets aside the 
question of whether the goals of compliant rebel groups are more likely to be perceived 
as valid by domestic actors in the state in which the conflict takes place (the host state) in 
order to consider whether rebel groups that comply with international humanitarian law 
are more likely to draw material support from foreign states.   
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 While previous work suggests a link between the desire for legitimacy and rebel 
group compliance with IHL (Ewumbe-Monono, 2006; Sivakumaran, 2006; Ryngaert, 
2008; Higgins, 2009; Bellamy, 2012), Jo’s (2015) work is the first book to rigorously test 
this link.  Jo’s (2015) central argument is that rebel groups seeking legitimacy are more 
likely to comply with IHL.  The database she uses to test her claim serves as the basis for 
the database constructed for this analysis.  Like Salehyan et al. (2011), by adopting 
McCubbins & Kiewiet’s (1991) principal-agent framework of congressional delegation to 
a principal-agent framework of rebel group compliance, Jo (2015) argues that foreign 
states (principals) can influence the behavior of rebel groups (agents) (p. 66).  She 
specifically considers the possibility that a foreign sponsor may provide tangible support, 
such as arms, when a rebel group shares sufficient common interests with the sponsor (Jo, 
2015).  Compliance with IHL indicates that rebel groups are willing to shift from the 
short-term gains of violence against civilians to the long-term benefits of being perceived 
as legitimate for adhering to humanitarian norms.  One possible, and testable, benefit of 
being perceived as legitimate is an increased likelihood of receiving support from a 
foreign state.   
 Scholarship regarding rebel group compliance often focuses on how compliance 
with IHL can legitimize rebel groups specifically in the eyes of Western democratic 
governments (Salehyan et al., 2014; Jo, 2015; Stanton, 2016).  For example, Stanton 
(2016) argues, “Belligerents can seek assistance from Western governments and IGOs by 
demonstrating a commitment to democracy and human rights.” (p. 7).   In support of this, 
Jo (2015) finds that the higher the number of human rights organizations (HROs) in a 
sponsor state, the less likely the rebel group is to kill civilians.  Also lending support to 
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this argument are experimental findings indicating that the U.S. public opinion is 
sensitive to violations of international law in the context of torture (Wallace, 2013), drone 
strikes (Kreps & Wallace, 2016).  Furthermore, in his analysis of cross-national data, 
Wallace (2019) finds that support for violence in conflict decreases when individuals are 
aware of IHL.  Wallace’s (2019) results suggest responsiveness to IHL in both 
democracies and non-democracies.  Complimentary to this, I argue that focusing on the 
relationship between rebel group compliance and perceptions of legitimacy among 
democracies ignores the reality that the majority of support for compliant rebel groups 
comes from non-democratic governments.  Furthermore, although Stanton (2016) 
suggests a link between compliance and assistance, testing this claim is outside the scope 
of her research.  On this matter, Stanton (2016) indicates that although rebel groups may 
comply with IHL in order to gain international support, they do not necessarily succeed.   
 Attention is also paid in the literature to the time period during which rebel groups 
became more likely to comply with IHL.  One group of scholars argues that rebel groups 
became more likely to comply after the end of the Cold War as strategic rivalries faded 
and advances in information technology increased awareness of mass atrocity (Bellamy, 
20124; Jo, 2015; Stanton, 2016).  While Stanton’s (2016) statistical analysis provides 
support for the argument that governments adhere more closely to IHL post-1989, her 
results for rebel group compliance post-1989 are insignificant.  In contrast, Ewumbe-
Monono (2006) and Higgins (2009) emphasize the proliferation of national liberation 
movements after World War II and consider IHL compliance by rebel groups in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   According the Bellamy’s (2012) logic, the norm of civilian immunity should be 
strongest after the end of the Cold War, but weakened after 2001 due to increasing 
military incentives to target civilians.	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context rather than the post-Cold War era, but do not provide empirical evidence to 
support this distinction.  This distinction is important, as it informs decisions to study the 
impact of rebel group compliance in a pre- or post-Cold War context.  Since Stanton 
(2016) finds that governments tend to adhere to IHL more closely since 1989, it is 
appropriate to use Jo’s (2015) database as the basis of my own.  
 In summary, scholars who study why rebel groups comply with IHL largely focus 
on legitimacy, but in doing so generally don’t consider whether legitimacy can be 
converted into material support.  By considering whether foreign states are more likely to 
provide support to rebel groups that comply with IHL, I am able to conduct an empirical 
analysis that furthers our understanding of why rebel groups comply that is not limited by 
the intangibility of legitimacy.  In addition, by focusing on the post-Cold War era, I am 
able to analyze the outcomes of rebel group compliance during a time period in which 
governments demonstrate greater value for compliance, reflected through their own 
increased compliance.  
 
Accidents of Interest: Privileging National Security over Compliance 
 In direct opposition to the previously discussed literature, Goldsmith & Posner 
(2005) argue that states comply with international law due to coincidences of interest, 
coercion, cooperation, or coordination.  Notably absent is compliance due to an 
acknowledged legal obligation (Goldsmith & Posner, 2005).  This logic suggests that 
states themselves comply with international humanitarian law due to its reciprocal nature; 
not targeting a foreign state’s civilians helps ensure that a state’s own citizens will not be 
targeted in turn.  It is no accident that IHL compliance is most likely when the laws can 
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be reciprocally enforced (Morrow, 2007): Compliance is in states’ interests.  This 
reciprocal framework does not exist with respect to rebel group compliance with IHL 
because a potential sponsor state is not concerned that a rebel group fighting in an 
internal conflict may one day attack civilians within its own borders.   
 Applying Goldsmith & Posner’s (2005) logic to rebel sponsorship indicates that 
because it is a coincidence of interest that states themselves comply with IHL, there is no 
reason for states to coerce potential sponsor states to only sponsor those rebel groups that 
comply with IHL.  As evidence, Goldsmith & Posner (2005) call attention to the United 
States’ inconsistent enforcement of human rights abroad (p. 117).  In a similar vein, 
Guzman (2008)5 argues that the reputational costs of defaulting on international 
commitments are marginal at best.  Where advancing security interests comes at the cost 
of reputation, states tend to make reputational sacrifices. 
 Even when states do have a sincere interest in upholding international human 
rights law, there is an incentive to free ride.  As long as there is a possibility that another 
state will punish the offending state, states have a decreased incentive to intervene 
(Posner, 2014).  There could, then, be a collective action problem with respect to 
sanctioning the sponsors of non-compliant rebel groups.  Additionally, Hopgood (2013) 
argues that the validity of human rights norms themselves are under attack; since human 
rights have been overtly tied to national security and economic interests and espoused as 
foreign policy, their moral underpinnings have eroded.  Taken together, one could 
surmise from these works that: 1. States have never had a strong incentive to punish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 While Goldsmith & Posner (2005) and Guzman (2008) consider overlapping interests, 
coordination, and cooperation as the basis of compliance with international law, Guzman 
(2008) emphasizes the role of reputation, contrasting with Goldsmith & Posner (2005). 
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states that sponsor rebel groups that commit mass atrocity; and 2. Even when states do 
sanction such sponsorship, they inadvertently undermine the foundations of IHL by 
framing such intervention as in the interest of national security.  
  
III. Theory 
 Since states are expected to support rebel groups that they perceive as legitimate, 
and since IHL compliance is argued to legitimize rebel groups, I argue that foreign states 
are more likely to provide diplomatic or military support to compliant rebel groups.  
Furthermore, I argue that this relationship holds regardless of whether the sponsor state is 
a democracy or a non-democracy.  While the audience that holds the leaders of 
democratic and non-democratic states accountable varies, the end result is the same for 
both groups.  In general, states are more likely to provide military or diplomatic support 
to compliant groups. 
 Democratic states are generally considered to value IHL highly (Salehyan et al., 
2014; Jo, 2015; Stanton, 2016).  This value is rooted in the public’s ability to hold the 
leaders of democratic states accountable for behaving in ways that the public views as 
undesirable, and this extends to foreign policy (Aldrich et al., 1989; Murdie & Davis, 
2012; Wallace, 2013; Kreps and Wallace, 2016; Wallace, 2019).  If the public finds the 
actions of a rebel group objectionable, there is little incentive for democratic leaders to 
provide support to the group.  However, it is also the case that non-democracies are 
susceptible to similar pressures.  Non-democracies are sensitive to pressure from both 
political elites and from the international community, if not from a robust civil society 
(Weeks, 2008; 2012; Hafner-Burton, 2009; Tomz, 2012).  As I argue below, these 
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sensitivities constitute a feedback loop that creates an incentive structure for non-
democracies to value rebel group compliance with IHL when making sponsorship 
decisions in as meaningful a way as do democracies. 
 Non-democracies are often treated as a unified group despite variation in the 
structures of non-democracies (Weeks, 2008; 2012).  Building upon Fearon’s (1994) 
conceptualization of audience costs, Weeks (2008) demonstrates that single party regimes 
can signal threats as credibly as democracies and that civilian regimes are no more likely 
to engage in conflict than democracies (Weeks, 2012).  This is due to the small circle of 
powerful elites that have the ability to push the leaders of these types of non-democracies 
out of power; these elites check the power of autocrats in much the same way that the 
broader public checks the power of democratically elected leaders (Weeks, 2008; 2012).  
These elites are sensitive to actions by the leader that can reduce the bargaining position 
of the state within the broader international community, and I as soon demonstrate, 
sponsorship of non-compliant rebel groups may reduce a state’s bargaining position. 
(Weeks, 2008; 2012).  A potential caveat is that leaders who face forcible removal from 
office may initiate conflict as a distraction from domestic threats to their position 
(Chiozza & Goemans, 2011).  However, rebel sponsorship is an avoidance of direct 
conflict, so I argue it is insufficient to serve as a distraction. 
 The connecting point in this feedback loop is located in the relationship between 
both democratic and autocratic states and the international community.  Tomz (2012) 
outlines a framework of cooperation and credibility, underpinned by the concepts of issue 
linkage and repeat play, in order to explain how reputation drives international loaning 
and repayment behavior.  He theorizes that because states will continue to encounter one 
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another and because misbehavior in one issue area may impact a separate issue area, 
states will tend to cooperate in order to maintain their reputation (Tomz, 2012).  As a 
human rights example of this phenomenon, Hafner-Burton (2009) demonstrates that 
Western democracies frequently link human rights conditions to preferential free trade 
agreements.   
 Autocratic states do not need a voting public in order to value rebel compliance 
with IHL.  Instead, they are held accountable by elites reacting to a reduction in the 
state’s international bargaining position.  The feedback loop is as such: If non-democratic 
states support rebel groups that commit atrocity and this has reputational costs with 
economic consequences, elites in those states are able to hold their leader accountable 
with the threat of removal from office.   
 Consider, for example, the case of Sudanese support for the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) (along with other non-compliant groups).  As Stanton (2016) notes, Sudan’s 
support for several rebel groups designated as terrorist groups, including the GIA, 
provoked the United States to place Sudan on its list of state sponsors of terrorism.  This 
undercut Sudan’s ability to receive international financial assistance, reducing its 
bargaining position.  Sufficiently violent rebel groups can attract the attention of the 
international community and such scrutiny may result in the punishment of the sponsor 
states that enabled the violence.  Omar al-Bashir’s support for a host of non-compliant 
rebel groups came at the cost of a reduction of foreign aid and trade partners.  This 
signals to other states considering sponsorship that supporting rebel groups that violate 
IHL may not be costless.  While al-Bashir did not lose power as a result, leaders with a 
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more tenuous grasp on power must consider the potential reputational consequences of 
providing support to rebel groups that commit mass atrocity. 
 Supporting non-compliant rebel groups is a doubly problematic for both 
autocratic and democratic leaders: First, the leaders expend resources supporting the 
group and second, the leaders may face reputational costs that result in economic 
consequences, catalyzing their removal from office.  Democratic states strive to maintain 
their reputation of upholding the human rights architecture, and, through the dominance 
of the neoliberal order, draw in non-democratic states.  Tomz’s (2012) argument indicates 
that this is due to a desire to foster cooperation across issue areas and keep reputations 
intact.  If the leader of State A is considering providing support to a rebel group that 
violates IHL and the leader of State A believes that State A may incur reputational losses 
for providing support, he or she must consider the possibility of losing office.  If the 
leader of State A is uncertain about his or her ability to retain office after sponsorship, the 
leader of State A should be less likely to provide support to the rebel group.  Here, the 
expectation of consequences from reputational losses outstrips the importance of actual 
consequences; states don’t need to be punished, but merely to act as if they might be for 
this framework to apply.   
 Since Western democratic states are the architects of IHL, these states should be 
expected to consider rebel group compliance when making sponsorship decisions.   
 Hypothesis I: Democratic states are more likely to sponsor a rebel group when the 
 rebel group expresses intent to comply with IHL. 
 
However, the above theory suggests that this relationship should hold for both 
democracies and autocracies. 
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 Hypothesis II: A foreign state is more likely to sponsor a rebel group when the 
 rebel group expresses intent to comply with IHL, regardless of regime type.    
 
 The final section of the literature review indicates that all states, regardless of 
regime type, face similar disincentives to punish states that aid rebel groups that violate 
IHL.  National security interests arising from the dyadic relationship between the host 
state and the sponsor state may dominate humanitarian concerns.  
 Hypothesis III: A foreign state is no more likely to sponsor a rebel group when 
 the group expresses intent to comply with IHL, regardless of regime type. 
 
 In sum, I first argue that democratic states should be more likely to provide 
support to rebel groups that comply with IHL.  I further theorize that autocratic states also 
have an incentive to support such rebel groups.  As a result, I expect rebel group 
compliance with IHL to be positively related to the likelihood of foreign states providing 
support to rebel groups regardless of whether the foreign states are democracies or 
autocracies.  In contrast, I consider the possibility that the relationship between the host 
state and sponsor state dominates sponsorship decisions and that these decisions are not 
impacted by how rebel groups behave towards civilians.  In the following section, I 
examine the empirical evidence both for and against each of these propositions.   
 
IV. Analyzing the Relationship Between Foreign State Support and Rebel 
Compliance 
 
I conduct a quantitative analysis of the relationship between foreign state 
sponsorship and rebel group compliance using a Firth logit regression, which is 
appropriate since the dependent variable, foreign state support, is binary.  This variable is 
from the Non-State Actors (NSA) data, coded to reflect whether rebel groups did or did 
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not receive foreign state sponsorship (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2013).  There 
are three degrees of support considered in this dataset: no support, alleged support, and 
explicit support.  Support consists of military and diplomatic support.  Like Salehyan et 
al. (2014), I include only the categories of no support and explicit support; alleged 
support is coded as no support.  This coding provides a more rigorous test of the 
hypotheses. 
The independent variable, rebel group compliance with IHL, is operationalized as 
the number of civilians killed by the rebel group.  This variable is drawn from Jo’s (2015) 
dataset; Jo sourced this variable from the UCDP One-sided Violence dataset (Eck & 
Hultman, 2007; Allansson, Melander, & Themnér, 2017).  Jo (2015) notes that data 
regarding rebel groups is especially sparse prior to the 2000s and that data is collected 
more extensively on certain rebel groups than others.  Missing data regarding civilians 
killed is therefore a limitation in this analysis.  Despite its flaws, this measure is 
appropriate since it captures the actions of rebel groups rather than expressions of intent 
to comply with IHL.  A model including the actions of rebel groups avoids biasing the 
results in favor of Hypotheses I and II by excluding public statements of intent to comply.  
Public statements of compliance may not necessarily translate to compliance, so talk may 
be “cheap” and more frequent than actual restraint.  By operationalizing compliance as 
the number of civilians killed by a rebel group each year, it is possible to capture actual 
compliance. 
I include in the analysis two additional models that operationalize rebel group 
compliance differently.  First, I consider the use of child soldiers by rebel groups.  This 
	   
 
19	  
variable is drawn from Jo’s (2015) data6 and is coded as 1 if a group uses child soldiers 
and as 0 if a group does not.  Second, also from Jo’s (2015)7 data, I analyze access to 
detention facilities.  This variable is coded as 0 for no access, 1 for partial access, and 2 
for complete access.  As Jo (2015) explains, a no access coding can be problematic, as it 
captures cases in which the rebel group doesn’t detain at all and in which the government 
prevents the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from entering the country 
or in which the country is too unsafe for the ICRC to visit (p. 273).  However, this coding 
should over-represent “no access” and bias the model against significant findings that 
suggest allowing access to detention centers increases the likelihood of foreign state 
sponsorship. 
 Several control variables are also necessary.  Several of these address the 
relationship between the host state and the sponsor state: the relative power of the 
sponsor state compared to the host state, whether a sponsor-host dyad is democratic, and 
whether the sponsor state and host state are contiguous.  First, San-Akca (2016) argues 
that sponsor states view rebel groups as extensions of alliances and value rebel groups for 
their ability to undermine the relative power of the host state.  Maoz & San-Akca (2012) 
find that weaker states are more likely to sponsor rebel groups in order to harass stronger 
rivals rather than directly confronting them. The relative power variable accounts for the 
relative strength of the sponsor state in comparison to the host state.  The Composite 
Index of National Capability (CINC) from the Correlates of War Project National 
Military Capabilities (v5.0) data is used for this measure (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 She attributes this data to Child Solider International, Lasley (2012), and Beber & 
Blattman (2013) 
7 Originally from Jo and Thomson (2013) 
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1972).  The CINC measure of the host state is divided by the CINC measures of the host 
plus the sponsor states.  A value greater than 0.5 signifies that the sponsor state is weaker 
than the host state. 
 Second, democracies are less likely to engage in militarized disputes with other 
democracies, which extends to an unwillingness to sponsor rebel groups fighting against 
more democratic host states (Chan, 1984; Bremer, 1992; Maoz & Russett 1992; 
Salehyan, 2008; Salehyan et al. 2011; Maoz & San-Akca, 2012; San-Akca, 2016).  To 
formulate the democratic dyad variable, in keeping with Salehyan et al. (2014) and Jo 
(2015), the polities of the sponsor and host states are sourced from the Polity IV data 
from the Center for Systemic Peace  (2017).  The “Polity2” variable is used, as it is more 
appropriate for time-series analysis: interruptions are treated as missing, anarchy is 
scored as zero, and transitions are prorated across the amount of time in which the 
transition occurred (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2017).  Salehyan et al. (2014) code states 
with a polity score greater than or equal to 6 as democracies and states with a polity score 
less than 6 as non-democracies and I adopt this coding.  Dyads in which both states are 
democracies are coded as 1; dyads in which only one state or neither state is a democracy 
are coded as 0. 
 Third, Byman et al. (2001), Harbom & Wallensteen (2005), and Salehyan (2007) 
indicate that states are more likely to provide support to rebel groups in the same 
neighborhood.  The contiguity variable accounts for whether the host and sponsor states 
share any measure of contiguity.  It is sourced from the Correlates of War Project Direct 
Contiguity Data, 1816-2016 (v3.2) (Stinnett, Tir, Schafe, Diehl, Gochman, 2002).  For 
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the purpose of this analysis, states that are separated by 400 miles of water or less receive 
a 1 and states that are separated by more receive a zero. 
 A second group of control variables deals with characteristics of a given conflict: 
the length of the conflict and the intensity of the conflict.  When conflicts last longer, 
rebels become more likely to receive sponsorship and civilian casualties will accumulate.  
Duration is calculated as the total number of years a conflict had lasted by 2009, based 
upon the NSA data (Cunningham et al. 2013). In higher intensity conflicts more civilian 
casualties may be inflicted, yet these higher intensity conflicts may also increase the 
interest of foreign states and the likelihood that they will become involved in the conflict 
through rebel group sponsorship.  The intensity variable is sourced from the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset, version 17.2 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, 
Strand, 2002).  The ACD codes minor conflicts as 1 (25-999 battle deaths per year) and 
war as 2 (over 1,000 battle deaths per year).  I use the maximum value for intensity over 
the course of a conflict, coding war as 1 and minor conflicts as 0 in order to account for 
the possibility that the status of a conflict as war influences the likelihood of foreign state 
support for a rebel group.   
 The final set of control variables relates to the rebel groups themselves: a 
comparison of the violence of the rebel group with the violence of the host state, whether 
the rebel group has a political wing, the strength of the rebel group’s command structure, 
and whether the rebel group has a transnational constituency.  It may be that absolute 
civilian casualties are less important than relative civilian casualties.  If the government is 
killing more civilians than a rebel group, sponsorship may be more likely even if the 
rebel group is also killing civilians.  Civilians killed by host is also drawn from Jo’s 
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(2015) dataset, and, as with the variable regarding civilians killed by rebel groups, Jo 
(2015) sourced this variable from the UCDP One-sided Violence dataset (Eck & 
Hultman, 2007; Allansson, Melander, & Themnér, 2017).   
 Rebel groups with a political wing may be more likely to seek domestic 
legitimacy by minimizing civilian casualties, and potential sponsors may be attracted to 
more firmly established groups.  Rebel group political wing is sourced from the NSA 
data (Cunningham et al., 2013).  It is coded as 1 if the rebel group has a political wing 
and as 0 otherwise.  Similarly, rebel groups with stronger command structures may be 
better able to enforce IHL compliance within their ranks and potential sponsors may be 
more willing to commit to more organized groups.  Also from the NSA dataset, strength 
of command structure ranges from low (1) to moderate (2) to high (3) (Cunningham et 
al., 2013).  Lastly, the presence of transnational constituencies with ties to the rebel group 
appears to increase the likelihood that a group will receive support (Salehyan et al., 
2011).  Whether a rebel group has transnational constituency support is drawn from the 
Non-State Actors in Conflict Dyadic data (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009).  
If a rebel group has explicit or tacit transnational constituency support, this is coded as 1; 
if not, 0.   
As mentioned previously, a Firth logit is used since support, a rare event, is only 
coded for 170 out of 41,185 observations.  This is a dyadic dataset, employing rebel 
group-potential sponsor state pair as the unit analysis, with one entry for each rebel 
group-potential sponsor state pair.  Every state is paired with every rebel group; if a state 
provides support to a rebel group, this is noted with a “1” for the dependent variable.  As 
a result, the dataset is 41,185 observations, with only 170 instances of support.  Since Jo 
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(2015) and Stanton (2016) suggest that IHL compliance should factor more heavily into 
sponsorship decisions since the end of the Cold War, this analysis includes internal 
conflicts identified by the Non-State Actors in Conflict Dyadic data from 1989-2009 
(Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2013).  The endpoint is 2009, as Jo’s (2015) 
compliance measures are employed.   
  
 
Results 
 This dyadic dataset contains one entry for each potential sponsor-rebel group pair.  
In the case of quantitative variables, yearly data is averaged over the course of the 
conflict.  The median value is used for categorical data8.  A disadvantage of this approach 
is that it is impossible to assess when sponsorship occurred in relation to annual civilian 
casualties.  This is a limitation of existing data.  As a result, each year of a conflict is 
coded as 1 if support was given at any point in the conflict and coded as 0 if support was 
never given.  This is discussed at length later in the analysis.  This method could 
potentially skew the support data by making it appear that more rebel groups received 
support than did due a high number of sponsors for a particular group.  However, the 
potential error resulting from this appears to be random and doesn’t skew the support 
variable.  In the NSA data, 44.8% of rebel groups received foreign state support and  
Table 1 indicates that in this dataset, 44.5% of rebel groups received support.  This is in 
part due to the difference in rebel groups represented in the NSA data and those with 
compliance measures in Jo’s (2015) data. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This does not systematically impact results; see Appendix for models with minimum 
and maximum categorical values. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for all Variables 
Variables              Min Max  Mean  Standard 
         Deviation N     
Support (military or diplomatic)          0 1 0.004   .065           41,185 
  
Civilians killed by rebel group            0     14,796.5  101.705 951.905     41,185 
(average per year) 
 
Child soldiers used by rebel group 0  1 .327  .469       39,701                               
 
Detention visits allowed  0 2    0          32,547 
by rebel group                          (median) 
  
Democratic dyad   0 1 0.155   .362          41,185 
 
Relative power   .0002 .999 0.583            0.334         40,060 
(host/host+sponsor) 
 
Contiguity                 0 1        .050          .402       41,185 
 
Duration    0 40 4.572  6.484       41,185 
 
Intensity  
(minor conflict vs war)                       0          1 .363  .481       38,345 
 
Civilians killed by host  0    21,978.66 162.35  1444.38     38,748  
(average per year)  
 
Rebel political wing   0 1 .328  .470       39,546        
 
Rebel command strength  1 3 2         34,616 
             (median)         
 
Transnational constituency  0 1 .343  .475       37,593 
(support for rebel group)   
 
 The average number of civilians killed per year by rebel groups ranges greatly, 
from as few as zero to as many as 14,796.  For example, in 1996, the Alliance of 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), operating in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, killed 27,445 civilians during the First Congo War.  While 
Hypotheses I and II suggest that foreign state support is unlikely when rebel groups don’t 
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minimize civilian casualties, the AFDL received support from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, 
and Zambia.  Rwanda is an outlier with respect to the number of civilians killed by the 
government.  An average number of nearly 22,000 civilians killed per year puts Rwanda 
approximately 20,000 civilians ahead of the next closest host state.  Due the presence of 
extreme outliers, the log of the average number of civilians killed by both rebel groups 
and governments is used.  
 The summary statistics include averages across all potential sponsor-rebel group 
pairs, so the summary statistics for host state-potential sponsor state characteristics reflect 
all entries, not just entries where support occurs.  The mean CINC ratio where support 
occurs is 0.352, with a standard deviation of 0.278.  This indicates that, contrary to 
expectations, the host is on average weaker than the sponsor.  Also of note, 32.3% of 
states shared some degree of contiguity in cases of sponsorship. 
 In approximately 5% of cases where sponsorship occurs the sponsor and host 
states are both democratic.  These include a conflict in Papua New Guinea in which the 
Solomon Islands sponsored the secessionist Bougainville Revolutionary Army and rebel 
sponsorship by India in conflicts in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.  While approximately 
95% of cases do not involve democratic dyads, the presence of any democratic dyads is 
of theoretical interest.  The democratic peace literature suggests that democracies do not 
go to war with other democracies, yet San-Akca (2016) argues that sponsorship can be 
conceptualized as an extension of an alliance.  Democratic sponsorship of rebel groups 
fighting against democratic hosts provides a challenge for the democratic peace literature.  
Analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this study, but future research should 
consider whether such sponsorship undermines the democratic peace. 
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Table 2. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State 
Support by Democracies 
Regressor    Partial Slope Coefficients 
                                                       (Standard Error)     
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3             
 
Civilians killed by rebel group -.069            
(average per year)   (.110) 
 
Child soldiers used by rebel group   .104 
       (.413) 
Detention visits allowed      .361 
by rebel group        (.276)  
 
Relative power   -2.096*** -2.102*** -2.062** 
(host/(host+sponsor))   (.595)  (.593)  (.640) 
 
Contiguity     .646***   .656***   .668***          
     (.148)  (.148)  (.154) 
      
Duration    .071*** .640**  .063** 
     (.020)  (.020)  (.020) 
 
Intensity     .604  .474  .596 
(minor conflict vs war)   (.401)    (.393)       (.433)               
 
Civilians killed by host  -.193*  -.201*  -.190*  
(average per year)   (.090)  (.090)  (.091) 
 
Rebel political wing   .024  .111      .391   
(Median value)   (.410)  (.386)  (.404) 
 
Rebel command strength  .550~  .548~  .473   
(Median value)   (.311)  (.313)  (.333)                   
 
Transnational constituency  .353  .337  .422 
(support for rebel group)    (.360)  (.360)  (.379) 
(Median value)  
 
Constant    -6.768*** -6.780*** -6.966*** 
     (.825)  (.845)  (.937) 
 
Wald chi2    59.27*** 59.08*** 53.26*** 
Number of observations   13,980           13,792         11,733              
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~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001 
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit 
 
 Table 2 reports the partial slope coefficients for each variable in order to assess 
Hypothesis I, which posits that democracies should be more likely to provide support to 
rebel groups that comply with IHL.  Note that democratic dyad is excluded from these 
models, as it is related to democracy.  The results do not support the hypothesis: there is 
no significant relationship between support and rebel killing of civilians, rebel use of 
child soldiers, or the allowance detention visits.  The most consistent findings across 
operationalizations of compliance are that democracies are more likely to provide support 
to rebel groups that are fighting in neighboring states, democracies are more likely to 
support rebels fighting in relatively weaker states, and longer conflicts are associated 
with an increased likelihood of rebel support.  In addition, democracies are less likely to 
intervene on the side of the rebels as the number of civilians killed by the host 
government increases. 
 Interestingly, the results presented in Table 3 indicate that autocracies behave 
markedly similar to democracies in their sponsorship of rebel groups.  The results for 
democratic sponsors regarding relative power, contiguity, and conflict duration all 
replicate for autocratic sponsors.  However, for autocracies there is no relationship 
between the number of civilians killed by the host state and the likelihood of sponsorship.  
In addition, autocracies are less likely to sponsor rebel groups with a political wing. 
 
Table 3. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State 
Support by Autocracies 
Regressor    Partial Slope Coefficients 
                                                       (Standard Error)     
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     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3             
 
Civilians killed by rebel group .087~            
(average per year)   (.046 
 
Child soldiers used by rebel group   .122 
       (.213) 
Detention visits allowed      .244~ 
by rebel group        (.139)  
 
Relative power   -2.956*** -2.908*** -2.856*** 
(host/(host+sponsor))   (.343)  (.349)  (.372) 
 
Contiguity     .485***   .480***   .407***          
     (.088)  (.089)  (.102) 
      
Duration    .056*** .053*** .062*** 
     (.014)  (.015)  (.014) 
 
Intensity     .296  .481*  .319 
(minor conflict vs war)   (.220)    (.215)       (.248)               
 
Civilians killed by host  .045  .043  .044  
(average per year)   (.040)  (.040)  (.044) 
 
Rebel political wing   -.778** -.807** -.773**   
(Median value)   (.250)  (.248)  (.265) 
 
Rebel command strength  -.238  -.235  -.171   
(Median value)   (.155)  (.159)  (.173)                   
 
Transnational constituency  .081  .187  .149 
(support for rebel group)    (.210)  (.205)  (.216) 
(Median value)  
 
Constant    -3.594*** -3.838*** -3.781*** 
     (.396)  (.410)  (.467) 
 
Wald chi2    128.87*** 121.69*** 102.84*** 
Number of observations   14,602           14,304         11,999              
~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001 
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit 
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 Below, Table 4 addresses Hypotheses II and III.  These hypotheses are the 
opposite of one another; Hypothesis II maintains that sponsorship decisions will be 
influenced by rebel group compliance with IHL regardless of regime type, whereas 
Hypothesis III makes the counter-point that compliance is not a factor in sponsorship 
decisions.  The results provide the strongest support for Hypothesis III: no 
operationalization of compliance is statistically significant at the .05 level.  As in the 
autocratic and democratic models, contrary to expectations stronger sponsor states tended 
to support rebel groups fighting in weaker host states.  This holds even when contiguity, a 
typical source of rivalry, is excluded from the model.  This could be because weaker 
states have fewer resources with which to sponsor rebel groups.   
 Consistent with expectations, democracies are far less likely to sponsor rebel 
groups that are fighting against other democracies.  This holds regardless of how rebel 
group compliance is conceptualized.  As in the democracy and autocracy models, 
contiguous states are significantly more likely to sponsor rebel groups operating in 
neighboring states.  Again, as expected, sponsorship is increasingly likely as conflicts 
continue, which is not surprising, as there is simply more opportunity for foreign states to 
become involved on the side of rebels.  Finally, states are less likely to sponsor rebel 
groups with a political wing.  While this is negative, strength of command structure is 
also included in the models.  The most likely explanation is that rebel groups with a 
political wing but a weak command structure are seen as less desirable by potential 
sponsors states.  Such political wings may have inconsistent policies and have difficulty 
achieving goals.   
 
	   
 
30	  
Table 4. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State 
Support  
Regressor    Partial Slope Coefficients 
                                                       (Standard Error)     
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3             
 
Civilians killed by rebel group .052            
(average per year)   (.042) 
 
Child soldiers used by rebel group   .081 
       (.186) 
Detention visits allowed      .209~ 
by rebel group        (.125)  
 
Relative power   -2.359*** -2.341*** -2.243*** 
(host/(host+sponsor))   (.288)  (.291)  (.312) 
 
Democratic dyad   -.957** -.923** -1.295** 
     (.347)  (.348)  (.449) 
 
Contiguity     .599***   .598***   .554***       
     (.075)  (.076)  (.084) 
      
Duration    .061*** .059*** .065*** 
     (.011)  (.012)  (.012) 
 
Intensity     .299  .423*  .363~ 
(minor conflict vs war)   (.195)    (.189)       (.217)               
 
Civilians killed by host  -.013  -.016  -.018  
(average per year)   (.036)  (.036)  (.039) 
 
Rebel political wing   -.564** -.582**     -.479*   
(Median value)   (.209)  (.205)  (.217) 
 
Rebel command strength  -.093  -.084  -.056   
(Median value)   (.137)  (.140)  (.152)                   
 
Transnational constituency  .173  .228  .239 
(support for rebel group)    (.181)  (.178)  (.188) 
(Median value) 
 
Constant    -4.459*** -4.504*** -4.681*** 
     (.353)  (.364)  (.414) 
  
Wald chi2    159.84*** 153.86*** 132.60*** 
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Number of observations   28,582            28,096         23,732              
~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001 
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit 
  
 These results suggest that democracies are as unresponsive as autocracies to rebel 
group compliance.  Instead, both democracies and autocracies are more likely to become 
involved on the side of rebels in conflicts that are geographically close, which is 
consistent with existing work.  When democracies and autocracies are considered 
together, a pattern of stronger states sponsoring rebel groups operating in weaker states 
emerges.  It is likely that weaker states simply can’t afford to intervene on behalf of rebel 
groups as often as can wealthier states.  This limits the ability of weaker states to 
undermine stronger rivals through sponsorship.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 The results of this analysis suggest that  Hypothesis III, that there is no 
relationship between foreign state support and rebel group compliance, be accepted.  This 
indicates that in the aggregate, IHL compliance does not consistently inform state 
decisions to provide military or diplomatic support to rebel groups.  Rather, the 
difference in military capabilities between the host state and sponsor state, the presence 
of democracy in both the host and sponsor, the duration of the conflict, and the 
geographic location of the host state and potential sponsor state are most important 
factors.  The general trend, then, is that characteristics of the host and sponsor state, as 
well as characteristics of the conflict, are better predictors of sponsorship than rebel 
compliance with IHL. 
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Appendix 
Table 5. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State 
Support by Democracies (Minimum Values) 
Regressor    Partial Slope Coefficients 
                                                       (Standard Error)     
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3             
 
Civilians killed by rebel group -.071            
(average per year)   (.111) 
 
Child soldiers used by rebel group   .147 
       (.417) 
Detention visits allowed      .361 
by rebel group        (.274)  
 
Relative power   -2.099*** -2.105*** -2.068** 
(host/(host+sponsor))   (.595)  (.592)  (.639) 
 
Contiguity     .643***   .654***   .665***         
     (.148)  (.148)  (.154) 
      
Duration    .070*** .062**  .062** 
     (.020)  (.020)  (.020) 
 
Intensity     .646  .503  .627 
(minor conflict vs war)   (.398)    (.389)       (.431)               
 
Civilians killed by host  -.194*  -.204*  -.192*  
(average per year)   (.090)  (.090)  (.091) 
 
Rebel political wing   .083  .177      .435  
(Minimum value)   (.414)  (.386)  (.402) 
 
Rebel command strength  .566~  .571~  .492   
(Minimum value)   (.308)  (.312)  (.332)                   
 
Transnational constituency  .329  .306  .395 
(support for rebel group)    (.363)  (.360)  (.375) 
(Minimum value) 
 
Constant    -6.808*** -6.841*** -6.993*** 
     (.818)  (.846)  (.923) 
  
Wald chi2    59.46*** 59.21*** 53.59*** 
Number of observations   13,980            13,792         11,733              
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~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001 
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State 
Support by Democracies (Maximum Values) 
Regressor    Partial Slope Coefficients 
                                                       (Standard Error)     
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3             
 
Civilians killed by rebel group -.046            
(average per year)   (.105) 
 
Child soldiers used by rebel group   .155 
       (.414) 
Detention visits allowed      .436 
by rebel group        (.277)  
 
Relative power   -2.104*** -2.106*** -2.059** 
(host/(host+sponsor))   (.595)  (.593)  (.640) 
 
Contiguity     .643***   .653***   .667***          
     (.148)  (.147)  (.154) 
      
Duration    .066**  .060**  .062** 
     (.019)  (.019)  (.019) 
 
Intensity     .606  .479  .578 
(minor conflict vs war)   (.400)    (.387)       (.425)               
 
Civilians killed by host  -.191*  -.196*  -.176~  
(average per year)   (.090)  (.090)  (.091) 
 
Rebel political wing   .453  .493  .842*   
(Maximum value)   (.373)  (.362)  (.395) 
 
Rebel command strength  .507~  .508~  .433   
(Maximum value)   (.306)  (.308)  (.324)                   
 
Transnational constituency  .284  .287  .406 
(support for rebel group)    (.355)  (.357)  (.377) 
(Maximum value) 
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Constant    -6.844*** -6.872*** -7.187*** 
     (.813)  (.838)  (.935) 
  
Wald chi2    60.86*** 60.42*** 55.28*** 
Number of observations   13,980            13,792         11,733             
~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001 
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State 
Support by Autocracies (Minimum Values) 
Regressor    Partial Slope Coefficients 
                                                       (Standard Error)     
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3             
 
Civilians killed by rebel group .095*            
(average per year)   (.046) 
 
Child soldiers used by rebel group   .114 
       (.214) 
Detention visits allowed      .265~ 
by rebel group        (.139)  
 
Relative power   -2.937*** -2.882*** -2.833*** 
(host/(host+sponsor))   (.343)  (.349)  (.372) 
 
Contiguity     .489***   .484***   .409***          
     (.088)  (.089)  (.102) 
      
Duration    .056*** .054*** .062*** 
     (.014)  (.015)  (.014) 
 
Intensity     .290  .488*  .320 
(minor conflict vs war)   (.219)    (.215)       (.249)               
 
Civilians killed by host  .043  .041  .042  
(average per year)   (.040)  (.040)  (.044) 
 
Rebel political wing   -.718** -.752** -.718**    
(Minimum value)   (.252)  (.250)  (.266) 
 
Rebel command strength  -.198  -.187  -.131   
(Minimum value)   (.154)  (.159)  (.172                   
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Transnational constituency  .032  .185  .147 
(support for rebel group)    (.215)  (.208)  (.219) 
(Minimum value) 
 
Constant    -3.693*** -3.756*** -3.896*** 
     (.395)  (.412)  (.462) 
  
Wald chi2    126.78*** 119.05*** 101.06*** 
Number of observations   14,602            14,304        11,999              
~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001 
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit 
 
 
 
Table 8. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State 
Support by Autocracies (Maximum Values) 
Regressor    Partial Slope Coefficients 
                                                       (Standard Error)     
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3             
 
Civilians killed by rebel group .100*            
(average per year)   (.045) 
 
Child soldiers used by rebel group   .125 
       (.213) 
Detention visits allowed      .259~ 
by rebel group        (.139)  
 
Relative power   -2.931*** -2.81*** -2.829*** 
(host/(host+sponsor))   (.342)  (.348)  (.371) 
 
Contiguity     .484***   .478***   .405***          
     (.088)  (.089)  (.101) 
      
Duration    .051*** .049**  .056*** 
     (.013)  (.014)  (.014) 
 
Intensity     .344  .546*  .391 
(minor conflict vs war)   (.220)    (.215)       (.249)               
 
Civilians killed by host  .029  .030  .032  
(average per year)   (.040)  (.040)  (.044) 
 
Rebel political wing   -.404~  -.442*     -.353   
(Maximum value)   (.219)  (.218)  (.232) 
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Rebel command strength  -.244  -.249  -.189   
(Maximum value)   (.151)  (.155)  (.169)                   
 
Transnational constituency  .055  .173  .149 
(support for rebel group)    (.207)  (.203)  (.214) 
(Maximum value) 
 
Constant    -3.628*** -3.657*** -3.829*** 
     (.391)  (.404)  (.462) 
  
Wald chi2    124.77*** 116.64*** 97.33*** 
Number of observations   14,602           14,304        11,999              
~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001 
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State 
Support (Minimum Values) 
Regressor    Partial Slope Coefficients 
                                                       (Standard Error)     
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3             
 
Civilians killed by rebel group .056            
(average per year)   (.042) 
 
Child soldiers used by rebel group   .092 
       (.187) 
Detention visits allowed      .226~ 
by rebel group        (.124)  
 
Democratic dyad   -.956** -.927** -1.295** 
     (.348)  (.348)  (.450) 
 
Relative power   -2.348*** -2.327*** -2.231*** 
(host/(host+sponsor))   (.288)  (.292)  (.312) 
 
Contiguity     .600***   .599***   .554***          
     (.075)  (.076)  (.084) 
      
Duration    .061*** .059*** .064*** 
     (.011)  (.012)  (.012) 
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Intensity     .308  .437*  .374~ 
(minor conflict vs war)   (.194)    (.188)       (.216)               
 
Civilians killed by host  -.015  -.018  -.021  
(average per year)   (.036)  (.036)  (.039) 
 
Rebel political wing   -.517** -.539** -.439*    
(Minimum value)   (.211)  (.207)  (.218) 
 
Rebel command strength  -.064  -.050  -.027   
(Minimum value)   (.136)  (.140)  (.152)                   
 
Transnational constituency  .141  .224  .241 
(support for rebel group)    (.185)  (.181)  (.189) 
(Minimum value) 
 
Constant    -4.529*** -4.592*** -4.758*** 
     (.351)  (.365)  (.408) 
  
Wald chi2    158.32*** 152.14*** 131.69*** 
Number of observations   28,582            28,096         23,732              
~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001 
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit 
 
 
 
Table 10. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State 
Support (Maximum Values) 
Regressor    Partial Slope Coefficients 
                                                       (Standard Error)     
     Model 1 Model 2 Model 3             
 
Civilians killed by rebel group .070~            
(average per year)   (.041) 
 
Child soldiers used by rebel group   .085 
       (.186) 
Detention visits allowed      .229~ 
by rebel group        (.125)  
 
Democratic dyad   -.956** -.918** -1.285** 
     (.348)  (.349)  (.450) 
 
Relative power   -2.350*** -2.329*** -2.233*** 
(host/(host+sponsor))   (.287)  (.291)  (.311) 
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Contiguity     .595***   .593***   .550***          
     (.075)  (.076)  (.083) 
      
Duration    .056*** .055*** .060*** 
     (.011)  (.012)  (.011) 
 
Intensity     .344~  .495**  .436* 
(minor conflict vs war)   (.193)    (.188)       (.215)               
 
Civilians killed by host  -.027  -.027  -.028  
(average per year)   (.036)  (.036)  (.039) 
 
Rebel political wing   -.190  -.219  -.075    
(Maximum value)   (.184)  (.183)  (.194) 
 
Rebel command strength  -.106  -.101  -.074   
(Maximum value)   (.133)  (.136)  (.145)                   
 
Transnational constituency  .139  .207  .231 
(support for rebel group)    (.178)  (.177)  (.186) 
(Maximum value) 
 
Constant    -4.501*** -4.541*** -4.758*** 
     (.347)  (.358)  (.409) 
  
Wald chi2    154.40*** 147.56*** 127.26*** 
Number of observations   28,582            28,096        23,732              
~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001 
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit 
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